

Коммуникационный менеджмент и стратегическая коммуникация в государственном управлении

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Стратегическая коммуникация Германии в Эстонии в годы второй мировой войны

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Аннотация

В статье исследуется «стратегическая коммуникация» немецких властей в годы оккупации Эстонии. В 1940-х годах не существовало термина «стратегическая коммуникация», но на практике эта деятельность осуществлялась разными методами. Эстония была оккупирована нацистской Германией с лета 1941 до осени 1944 года, и на протяжении этого времени наблюдение за настроениями граждан и пропагандистская работа координировались полицией безопасности Германии. Проведенный анализ показывает, что оценки ситуации и оперативные планы, выработанные немецкой полицией, практически полностью соответствуют принципам, разработанным министерством обороны США почти семьдесят лет спустя. Таким образом, стратегическая коммуникация базируется в большой степени на подходах, которые не зависят от времени, места или культурных особенностей. В дополнение к теоретическому анализу в исследовании представлен практический опыт использования принципов стратегической коммуникации в Эстонии в годы Второй мировой войны.

Ключевые слова

Пропаганда, стратегическая коммуникация, полиция безопасности (Зипо), Эстония, Вторая мировая война.

Introduction

Since the 1990s, strategic communication has seen increased interest in the areas of research and practical use. Areas in which strategic communication have been applied include foreign and domestic affairs (policy), military affairs, economics, communication and management. The term «strategic communication» has been in broad use through the last two decades particularly within the Anglo-American language area, and from there it has spread throughout the world. On one hand, it is apparent that of the major players in world politics, for example in Russia, the term is not in use in official documents and instead the term «state information policy» is used. However, as E. Pashentshev has found, the concept of strategic communication is nevertheless included in the more broad concept mentioned above¹. It is important to note that strategic communication can be found in situations and contexts in which it is not directly mentioned. Likewise, it is possible to analyze its content, although there is variation in the formal terms of its use.

¹ Пашенцев Е.Н. Стратегическая коммуникация России в Латинской Америке и ее интерпретация в США // Государственное управление. Электронный вестник. 2012. № 33. URL: http://e-journal.spa.msu.ru/vestnik/item/33_2012pashentsev.htm (13.11.2013).

There has been a great amount of debate among scholars as to what «strategic communication» means exactly. In English-speaking areas, perhaps the most important point of comparison has been «public diplomacy». Contradictory interpretations have been made of the relative relationship between the terms: some have considered public diplomacy to be part of strategic communication, some have interpreted the scale and relative hierarchy of the terms as opposites, and some have declared the terms to be (almost) synonymous². Based on this debate it is clear that no one, accepted definition of strategic communication exists. Additionally, it is not the intent of this article to provide an exact universal definition, but the actual content of strategic communication is the subject of this analysis.

When the core content of strategic communication is examined, it is apparent that there is a fairly large consensus among different researchers regarding the basic elements of the concept. D.M. Murphy, for example, has summarized the thought in one sentence: «Strategic communication is, at its essence, the orchestration of actions, words, and images to create cognitive information effects»³. Consistent interpretations are given from several other researchers⁴, and in a simplified sense, the aforementioned idea is also the basis of this article. This study analyses the manifestation of strategic communication in situations and at a time when the concept did not yet exist, nor were the ideas it is based on formulated yet in the way they are today.

A second more practical approach is to use the short program of the United States Department of Defense, prepared in 2008, as a point of reference to identify the occurrence of strategic communication in cases earlier than those in recent history. In this context, the program is not interpreted as the «sole legitimate» descriptor, but it is only one possible program of principles. However, it contains a wealth of issues raised by researchers and those defining strategic communication, and this is why it is well-suited as a descriptive point of comparison, or a theoretical starting point. In the «Principles of Strategic Communication»

² Paul C. Whither Strategic Communication? A Survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations // Rand Corporation Occasional Paper. URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP250.html (14.11.2013).

³ Murphy D.M. In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication // Parameters. US Army War College Quarterly. Winter 2009–10. P. 105–116. URL: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/getDoc.cfm?fileID=275> (14.11.2013).

⁴ Bockstette C. Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques / George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Occasional Paper Series. 2008. No 20. P. 9. URL: <http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/en/component/content/article/43-cat-pubs-occ-papers/633-art-pubs-occ-papers-20.html?directory=19> (14.11.2013); Hallahan K., Holtzhausen D., Van Ruler B., Verčič D., Siramesh K. Defining strategic communication // International Journal of Strategic Communication. 2007. Vol. 1. Issue 1. P. 3–7, 17; Mahoney J. Horizons in Strategic Communication: Theorising a Paradigm Shift // International Journal of Strategic Communication. 2011. Vol. 5. Issue 3. P. 143–146; Halloran R. Strategic Communication // Parameters. US Army War College Quarterly. Autumn 2007. P. 5–6. URL: <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/07autumn/halloran.htm> (18.01.2013);

compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense the concept and the principles of applying it are condensed into nine main categories:

- (1) Leadership-Driven. Leaders must lead communication process;
- (2) Credible. Perception of truthfulness and respect;
- (3) Understanding. Deep comprehension of others;
- (4) Dialogue. Multi-faceted exchange of ideas;
- (5) Pervasive. Every action sends a message;
- (6) Unity of Effort. Integrated and coordinated;
- (7) Results-Based. Tied to desired endstate;
- (8) Responsive. Right audience, message, time, and place;
- (9) Continuous. Analysis, planning, execution, assessment⁵.

This article examines the «strategic communication» of German authorities during the occupation of Estonia in 1941–1944. It is clear that during this time, the term did not exist, but research questions are not anachronistic when one remembers that the same thing can be and has been expressed in different ways. In Germany and elsewhere during the Second World War, the term mainly in use was propaganda. The goals and means of propaganda closely resembled and resemble those of strategic communication, although there are differences that can be found, relating mostly to the difference of the historical situation and the more thorough knowledge of today in relation to the mechanisms and possibilities of human communication. Strategic communication is also understood as a more comprehensive function than how propaganda was understood⁶. Nevertheless, this does not conflict with the fact that decades ago, agencies of propaganda operated quite similarly according to principles of strategic communication that were outlined later.

Estonia was occupied by Germany from the summer of 1941 to autumn of 1944, during which time surveillance of individual's sentiments and propaganda work were coordinated by Germany's Security Police⁷. Analysis of secret documents compiled by the Security Police shows that the organisation's situation assessments and the operating plans compiled on that basis correspond nearly 100 percent to the principles compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense almost 70 years later. This indicates that strategic communication is based heavily on viewpoints that are not dependent on time, place or culture. The German

⁵ Principles of Strategic Communication / United States of America, Department of Defence. August 2008 (hereafter cited as USDOD). P. 4. URL: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/getDoc.cfm?fileID=142> (18.01.2013).

⁶ Jowett G.S., O'Donnell V. Propaganda & Persuasion. Los Angeles: Sage, 2012. P. 1–7; Taylor P.M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003. P. 1–15.

⁷ Noormets T. Saateks // Eesti Julgeolekupolitsei aruanded 1941–1944. Tallinn: Riigiarhiiv, 2002. P. 11–15.

Security Police — used here as an example — followed these universal principles internally even though they had not yet been formulated into a theoretical programme.

In addition to theoretical contemplation, this study also analyses the main points of what taking these principles into consideration meant in practice in Estonia during World War II. For instance, the fact that the German ruling power had to cooperate with the Estonian Self-Administration, created as a local ancillary organisation for the occupying administration, posed its own challenge. The viewpoints and goals of the Estonian functionaries did not always coincide seamlessly with those of the Germans. The same problem applied to ordinary Estonians' opinions and hopes, which were often contradictory to the views of the Germans⁸. Thus, getting the Estonians to support the war objectives of the Germans required carefully deliberated propaganda work and utilisation of the principles of strategic communication.

In the summer of 1942, Dr. Martin Sandberger, the head of the German Security Police in Estonia, compiled an extensive report on matters within his own field. The material was acquired during the first year of occupation, between July 1941 and June 1942, but the report also included a detailed evaluation of matters on which the German occupation administration should concentrate attention in the future in order to retain and strengthen the willingness of Estonians to cooperate⁹. This report is a key document for the analysis of Security Police opinions concerning the condition of «strategic communication» and its developmental needs. In other surviving archival material from the Security Police, for the years 1941–1944, the same concerns often arise, though in a simpler form. The most essential part of the prevailing material (bi-monthly, monthly and annual reports) has been published as a source collection¹⁰. A comprehensive report from the summer of 1944 is otherwise similar to that from the summer of 1942 but makes fewer recommendations for further action¹¹.

The following account systematically compares the U.S. Department of Defense document with documents from the German Security Service. The analysis focuses on clarifying briefly the extent to which the «strategic communication» priorities of the two organizations mirror each other and what the practical consideration of these priorities essentially involved in German-occupied Estonia during World War II.

⁸ *Nurmis R.* Das feingeschliffene Glas. Saksa okupatsiooniaegne propaganda organisatsioon Eestis 1941–1944. Magistritöö (unpublished M.A. thesis). Tartu: Tartu Ülikool, 2011. P. 128–131.

⁹ The original document has been published in the source collection: Eesti Julgeolekupiditsei aruanded [Reports of the Security Police in Estonia] 1941–1944. Tallinn: Riigiarhiiv, 2002 (hereafter cited as EJA). P. 21–86.

¹⁰ EJA. P. 87–288.

¹¹ Ibid. P. 289–363.

The comparative analysis

(1) Leadership-Driven. To ensure integration of communication efforts, leaders should place communication at the core of everything they do. Successful Strategic Communication — integrating actions, words, and images — begins with clear leadership intent and guidance. Desired objectives and outcomes are then closely tied to major lines of operation outlined in the organization, command or joint campaign plan. The results are actions and words linked to the plan. Leaders also need to properly resource strategic communication at a priority comparable to other important areas such as logistics and intelligence¹².

This principle is not mentioned directly in the documents from the German Security Service, but its importance is indirectly revealed. For example, in the summer of 1942 the extensive report (Sandberger) stressed that propaganda should, in the future, be subject to more detailed control. Communication with the Estonians had not succeeded as well as it might have during the first years of occupation, but weak leadership was not mentioned as a reason for this¹³.

The fact that the leadership was not criticized may be associated with two factors. First, propaganda was managed, in principle, by the chief of the German Security Police, who would thus have had to criticise himself in his report. Another option would have been to criticize leaders at a still higher level of the occupation regime, the Commissioner-General of Estonia (Karl-Siegmund Litzmann) or the leader of the Reichskommissariat Ostland (Hinrich Lohse), which would also have been difficult. Neither military nor civilian organizations generally make it easy to criticize the activities of superiors. On the other hand, the Security Police chief did refer to the importance of good leadership by thanking the Commissioner-General for some effective propaganda measures. According to Sandberger's interpretation, Litzmann's personal intervention in grievances had particularly helped to maintain Estonian confidence in the willingness and ability of the German occupation regime to look after Estonian interests¹⁴.

(2) Credible. Credibility and consistency are the foundation of effective communication; they build and rely on perceptions of accuracy, truthfulness, and respect. Actions, images, and words must be integrated and coordinated internally and externally with no perceived inconsistencies between words and deeds or between policy and deeds. Strategic Communication also requires a professional force of properly trained, educated, and attentive

¹² USDoD. P. 4.

¹³ EJA. P. 21–31.

¹⁴ Ibid. P. 22–23, 114–115, 119, 128, 135.

communicators. Credibility also often entails communicating through others who may be viewed as more credible¹⁵.

The importance of credibility appeared continually in material collected by the German Security Police throughout the occupation period. One of the tasks of the Security Police was comprehensively to clarify Estonian opinions and attitudes on a variety of subjects. One of the most frequently mentioned problems in the collected material was that Estonians were sensitive to contradictions between words and deeds¹⁶. To ensure the acceptance of propaganda it was essential to minimize conflicts, which in most cases meant adjusting the content of propaganda to provide a better fit with reality. Evidently the Security Police was more pragmatic in this respect than the German Propaganda Ministry, led by Goebbels. Goebbels seems to have believed that the drastically altered truth, even outright lies, could convince the target audience, provided the propaganda was skillfully planned and its messages repeated sufficiently often¹⁷. The Security Police stated that this model did not work, at least in Estonia, and sought to remedy its own actions accordingly.

(3) Understanding. An individual's experience, culture, and knowledge provide the context shaping their perceptions and therefore their judgment of actions. We must understand that concepts of moral values are not absolute, but are relative to the individual's societal and cultural narrative. Audiences determine meaning by interpretation of our communication with them; thus what we say, do, or show, may not be what they hear or see. Acting without understanding our audiences can lead to critical misunderstandings with serious consequences. Understanding subjective impacts of culture, language, history, religion, environment, and other factors is critical when crafting communication strategy for a relevant population. Building relationships and collaboration with the interagency, coalition, host nation, academic, non-profit, and business communities can facilitate better understanding of audiences¹⁸.

The German Security Police were fully aware that mistakes had been made in this area and that improved attention to cultural differences would be essential to the future success of their communications. Although Estonia and Germany were basically quite similar societies, some noteworthy differences were observed in public attitudes. The Estonians, for example, were found to be clearly more suspicious of propaganda in general; the kind of open propaganda that provoked no resistance in Germany sparked irritation among Estonians¹⁹.

¹⁵ USDoD. P. 5.

¹⁶ EJA. P. 21, 87, 149, 157, 174, 184–186, 202–203, 209, 214–215, 259–260.

¹⁷ *Doob E.* Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda // *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. 1950. Vol. 14. No 3. P. 419–442.

¹⁸ USDoD. P. 5.

¹⁹ EJA. P. 28–30.

The Security Police realized that propaganda designed for Russians or Ukrainians did not work in Estonia, even though they were operating within what was technically «Soviet territory». In Estonia, the standard of living was much higher before the war, and the population had greater opportunities to influence public policy than their counterparts in the Soviet Union. The general-purpose propaganda prepared by the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories did not, therefore, appeal to Estonians; themes and methods had to be adjusted, sometimes considerably, before the material could be used in Estonia²⁰.

(4) Dialogue. Effective communication requires a multi-faceted dialogue among parties. It involves active listening, engagement, and the pursuit of mutual understanding, which leads to trust. Success depends upon building and leveraging relationships. Leaders should take advantage of these relationships to place policies and actions in context prior to operations or events. Successful development and implementation of communication strategy will seldom happen overnight; relationships take time to develop and require listening, respect for culture, and trust-building²¹.

In Estonian conditions, dialogue specifically meant building cooperation with Estonians. As early as the first year of occupation, the German Security Police found that Estonians working in the administration with Germans, including Estonians involved in preparing propaganda, wanted more responsibility and decision-making power. The leadership of the Security Police therefore recommended greater respect for the views of Estonians, provided that direct benefits to Germany were not affected²². Reports on the public mood clearly showed the effectiveness of Commissioner-General Litzmann's habit of building confidence by frequently mingling with the people and listening to their concerns²³. Wider dialogue between Germans and Estonians, however, remained largely unachieved owing to the dogmatic attitudes of the German leadership: they viewed the peoples under German rule in the East, without distinction, as valueless assistants to whom they did not wish to give real decision-making powers and whose national-cultural aspirations they believed required only a minimal response²⁴.

(5) Pervasive. Communication no longer has boundaries, in time or space. All players are communicators, wittingly or not. Everything the Joint Force says, does, or fails to

²⁰ EJA. P. 28, 199, 215–216, 246–249, 268–274.

²¹ USDoD. P. 5.

²² EJA. P. 29, 51–54, 272.

²³ Ibid. P. 22–23, 180, 193, 199, 206–207, 212–213.

²⁴ *Isberg A.* Zu den Bedingungen des Befreiers. Kollaboration und Freiheitsstreben in dem von Deutschland besetzten Estland 1941 bis 1944. Stockholm: Almqvist&Wiksell, 1992. P. 148–153; *Myllyniemi S.* Die Neuordnung der baltischen Länder 1941–1944. Zum nationalsozialistischen Inhalt der deutschen Besatzungspolitik. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1973. P. 286–292.

do and say, has intended and unintended consequences. Every action, word and image sends a message, and every team member is a messenger, from the 18-year-old rifleman to the commander. All communication can have strategic impact, and unintended audiences are unavoidable in the global information environment; therefore, leaders must think about possible «Nth» order communication results of their actions²⁵.

The German Security Police were well aware that communication involved a combination of behaviour and all the tools of the media. Security Service reports criticized the arrogant, insolent, and openly self-serving behaviour of some Germans. This created in Estonians a picture of Germans as greedy and reckless exploiters who did not appreciate the Estonians' willingness to cooperate and who did not care about Estonian well-being. One of the key messages that the Security Police presented in their reports was that Estonians must be made to feel that they were valued and considered as equals²⁶. Otherwise, relations between Estonians and Germans would be further worsened, and this would conflict with the overall interests of Germany. The Security Police clearly understood that the creation of a positive image of the German occupation regime was the fundamental key to preserving an Estonian desire to cooperate and to inspiring Estonians with a wish to work for the promotion of German war aims. The problem once again was the unwillingness of the German leadership to take account sufficiently of the viewpoints and measures recommended by the Security Service.

(6) Unity of effort. Strategic Communication is a consistent, collaborative process that must be integrated vertically from strategic through tactical levels, and horizontally across stakeholders. Leaders coordinate and synchronize capabilities and instruments of power within their area of responsibility, areas of influence, and areas of interest to achieve desired outcomes. Recognizing that your agency / organization will not act alone, ideally, all those who may have an impact should be part of communication integration²⁷.

In the case of Estonia, the German Security Police tried to take this viewpoint into account on two levels. Firstly, the Security Police allocated adequate human resources to adjust propaganda to local conditions. This meant that the basic material provided by the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories was screened and converted into a form in which it would better serve German targets specifically in Estonia. Secondly, the Security Police closely monitored the propaganda activities of the Estonian Self-Administration (the Directorate) and sought to unify its messages with those conveyed by the German occupation

²⁵ USDoD. P. 5.

²⁶ EJA. P. 29–30, 289–297.

²⁷ USDoD. P. 5–6.

regime²⁸. For instance, there were regular guidance meetings for Estonian newspaper journalists, or in some cases direct briefing sessions, in which journalists were instructed in writing articles that would be appropriate from the German viewpoint. For the Germans, a persistent problem was that Estonians constantly strove to write articles in which Estonian national interests were 'too strongly' displayed. The Germans also thought it detrimental that Estonians wished to follow the communications of neutral countries, and even of enemy countries such as Great Britain, and to summarize them too sympathetically in the Estonian media²⁹.

(7) Results-Based. Strategic Communication should be focused on achieving specific desired results in pursuit of a clearly defined endstate. Communication processes, themes, targets and engagement modes are derived from policy, strategic vision, campaign planning and operational design. Strategic communication is not simply «another tool in the leader's toolbox», but must guide all an organization does and says; encompassing and harmonized with other functions for desired results³⁰.

German short-term goals in Estonia involved harnessing Estonian natural and human resources as efficiently as possible in support of the German war effort. Secret scenarios for the post-war future were more indefinite, but in any case it was intended that Estonia should be unified with Germany and would be «Germanized» within a few generations³¹. War-time propaganda sought to conceal plans for the future and to focus on the demands of war. The German Security Police in Estonia had a clear vision of these priorities. The Security Police sought to guide both Germans and Estonians to co-operate on propaganda which would concentrate all forces on winning the war. Comments on the future were limited to vague references to the view that Estonians, as well as other peoples fighting on the side of Germany, would find that their part in the «New Europe» would be directly proportional to their national contribution to victory: the more diligent the effort, the better their part would be³².

(8) Responsive. Strategic Communication should focus on long-term end states or desired outcomes. Rapid and timely response to evolving conditions and crises is important as these may have strategic effects. Communication strategy must reach intended audiences through a customized message that is relevant to those audiences. Strategic Communication involves the broader discussion of aligning actions, images, and words to support policy, overarching strategic objectives and the longer term big picture. Acting with adversaries'

²⁸ EJA. P. 27–31; 289–296.

²⁹ Ibid. P. 24–28, 292, 372. See also *Nurmis R.* Op. cit. P. 57.

³⁰ USDoD. P. 6.

³¹ *Myllyniemi S.* Op. cit. P. 145–169.

³² EJA. P. 21–30, 184–193.

decision cycles is also key because tempo and adaptability count. Frequently there will be a limited window of opportunity for specific messages to achieve a desired result³³.

An organization must remain flexible enough to address specific issues with specific audiences, often at specific moments in time, by communicating to achieve the greatest effect. All communication carries inherent risk and requires a level of risk acceptance within the organization. Leaders must develop and instill a culture that rewards initiative while not overreacting to setbacks and miscues. While risk must be addressed in the form of assumptions in planning, it should not restrain leaders' freedom of action providing it has been taken into consideration appropriately³⁴.

The Security Police saw correct allocation and scheduling as a very important element in communication. Collected reports paid constant attention to the confusion and anger caused in recipients by outdated, poorly designed messages, and by messages inappropriate to the situation. For example, when the war situation developed quickly in the summer of 1944, German propaganda in Estonia quickly lost credibility when the public continued to see news films prepared in winter and spring rather than up-to-date and realistic information about the decisive summer battles fought in Belarus and in Normandy³⁵. The Security Police were aware that news unfavourable from the German standpoint would in any case reach Estonia, for instance via BBC radio broadcasts, despite bans on listening. The conclusions of the Security Police therefore stressed that German propaganda should be more realistic and that it should more quickly and fully take into account the developing situation as well as the attitudes and level of knowledge of the target audience³⁶.

(9) Continuous. Strategic Communication is a continuous process of research and analysis, planning, execution, and assessment. Success in this process requires diligent and continual analysis and assessment feeding back into planning and action. Strategic Communication supports the organization's objectives by adapting as needed and as plans change. The Strategic Communication process should ideally operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries³⁷.

It may be said that one of the primary tasks of the Security Police was to fulfil ongoing functions of data collection and analysis. One of the starting points emphasized for the organization's activities was that data collected in «the field» should be submitted

³³ USDoD. P. 6.

³⁴ Ibid. P. 6.

³⁵ EJA. P. 289–296.

³⁶ Ibid. P. 25–26, 28, 297, 372.

³⁷ USDoD. P. 6.

unchanged to the higher levels of the Security Police — not selectively, not concealing information or people's opinions, and neither exaggerating nor understating. According to those instructions, all intelligence work would seek to ensure that the Security Police could build up as truthful and up-to-date a picture as possible of Estonian opinions and attitudes³⁸.

Supplementary approaches and conclusions

Overall, it is clear that, in 1941–1944, the German Security Police in Estonia applied principles of strategic communication to the monitoring, analysis and design of propaganda, even though the concept did not yet exist. When one compares the reports and strategies of the Security Police with the strategic communication program assembled by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2008, a very high level of consistency is evident. Out of nine main points, eight came strongly to the forefront in the work of the Security Police. The only point not directly mentioned, owing to factors described above, was the need for a leadership-driven approach. Conceptually, this point in the program was nonetheless visible in the background of the other recommendations and practical actions of the Security Police.

A further confirmation to this analysis is provided by another model of strategic communication presented by C. Bockstette. He has summarized the principles as follows:

(1) Analyze and develop the final desired end states and establish your communication goals: Reputation // Image // Brand name // Deliberate message // Desired Action.

(2) Analyze your communication infrastructure: Suitable media // Timing // Personal, technical and financial capacities.

(3) Target your audience(s) and select communication channels: General public // Own patronage // Multipliers within society // Journalists // Decision makers // Call to audience to do something specific // Convey your deliberate message(s) utilizing appropriate media.

(4) Develop and execute the strategic communication management plan: Define communication objectives // Develop communication tactics // Establish strategies // Write strategic communication management plan // Execute strategic communication plan and develop tasks thereof.

(5) Track and evaluate: Feedback // Media analysis // Monitoring of audience actions // Comparison of desired end states and defined goals³⁹.

It is apparent that Bockstette's model resembles that of the United States Department of Defense, but there are also a few differences. Since most of the issues presented by Bockstette have already been discussed above, I will only focus on the additional aspects that

³⁸ *Noormets T.* Op. P. 15–17.

³⁹ *Bockstette C.* Op. cit. P. 9.

Bockstette offers in comparison to that of the United States Department of Defense. In the first paragraph, emphasis is put on the importance of factors related to reputation and perception. Germany's main concern during the war did not relate to its reputation among the nations that it had occupied, but was mainly concerned with winning the war and getting people to work efficiently in its favour. However, the German Security Police clearly noted that the motivations of Estonians in regards to cooperation were linked to Germany and the reputation of Germans. On several occasions, reports expressed the concern that Estonians no longer regarded Germans as their admired liberators, but opinions were changing for the worse. It was estimated that this trend would have a direct negative impact on the achievement of Germany's goals⁴⁰. The only aspect that was not apparent in the material of the Security Police in regards to this first paragraph was the concept of a «brand». This term has come into common use much later; therefore there is no reason to wonder over its absence in materials of the Second World War. In any case, in thought, this aspect was included in the goal — that Germany should appear to be the world's leading state militarily, politically and culturally.

Paragraph two highlights the allocation of sufficient resources for the implementation of strategic communication and the organization of appropriate media channels. According to this principle, the administration of the German occupation had a broad propaganda machine in Estonia as in other occupied areas. Of the five departments of the German administration of the occupied area, one (politics) mainly focused on propaganda. In addition, of the local auxiliary body established — the Estonian Self-Administration — one directorate (ministry) was responsible for propaganda work that followed the German pattern. Organizations operating in Estonia also continuously received plenty of basic material for their use from the propaganda machine of *Ostland* and *Ostministerium*⁴¹. It is debatable whether the resources were sufficient for the propaganda machine in relation to the actual goals, but it is essential to note that the focus was clearly put on the implementation of propaganda and there was a desire to provide a relatively large amount of resources in this direction.

Paragraph three specifies the targets of strategic communication in more detail than the United States Department of Defense. The German Security Police considered these principles very closely. First, the Estonian radio was intended for the general public and was under strict German control. Estonian collaborators had a minimal role in its operation⁴². The

⁴⁰ EJA. P. 21, 87, 149, 157, 174, 184.

⁴¹ *Maripuu M.* German civilian administration in Estonia in 1941–1944 // *Estonia 1940–1945. Reports of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity.* Tallinn: Estonian foundation for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity, 2006. P. 525–528; *Nurmis R.* Op. cit. P. 36–47.

⁴² EJA. P. 28. See also *Nurmis R.* Op. cit. P. 56–58.

other media channel meant for the general public was the Estonian press, the supervision of which was also exact. The number of pages was minimal, so that control over the contents was easier. Editors of the Estonian press were also regularly instructed on how to deal with different themes and told what should be emphasized and what should be banned outright⁴³. The German-language *Revaler Zeitung* was privileged in terms of its amount of print material, the content of which was meant to reinforce the opinions of those who supported the German administration. The focus of content in the Estonian language press and radio was meant to gain the support of Estonians for the German administration and war aims⁴⁴.

The implementation of the principles mentioned in the fourth and fifth paragraphs has already been analyzed in essential respects above. However, it can be summed up in brief that the German Security Police took into account all the perspectives mentioned by Bockstette. Martin Sandberger, the Chief of the Security Police in the summer of 1942, was particularly careful in this work. His plan and the analysis it included can be regarded almost as a model example in its implementation of the basics of strategic communication that were later outlined⁴⁵. It is an entirely different matter that Sandberg's plan had no effect on what he had hoped for himself. Too many organizations and individuals in the German administration operated in a different way than his plan would have required. Ultimately of course, the changing fortunes of Germany in the war and Germany's withdrawal from Estonia shattered the plan as a whole. In 1943 Sandburg himself moved to new responsibilities in German-occupied Northern Italy⁴⁶, and his followers in Estonia no longer analyzed propaganda operations with the same precision and versatility and did not develop such clear plans for the success of Germany's «strategic communication»⁴⁷.

In conclusion, this analysis confirms the conclusions of those researchers who have suggested that *successful* communication is inevitably based, consciously or unconsciously, on attention to strategic principles⁴⁸. Strategic communication is therefore not really a matter of new approaches, independent of the old, but rather of holistic and purpose-driven design. In addition, it may be considered that successful communication is based on universal structural principles that are essentially independent of time, place, and culture. Naturally, there may be

⁴³ Nurmis R. Op. cit. P. 83–91.

⁴⁴ EJA. P. 27. See also Nurmis R. Op. cit. P. 77–83.

⁴⁵ See, in particular, EJA. P. 21–30, 87–90.

⁴⁶ Maripuu M. Op. cit. P. 521, 1172–1173.

⁴⁷ EJA. P. 289–296.

⁴⁸ Halloran R. Op. cit. P. 5–6; Kellermann K. Communication: Inherently strategic and primarily automatic // Communication Monographs. 1992. Vol. 59. Issue 3. P. 288–300.

considerable variance in the practical application of these principles according to operating environment, temporal context, and target audience⁴⁹.

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⁴⁹ *Halloran R.* Op. cit. P. 4–14; *Mahoney J.* Op. cit.; *Murphy D.M.* The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s) // Center for Strategic Leadership. U.S. Army War College. Issue Paper. 2008. Vol. 2-08. URL: [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/IP2-08TheTroubleWithStrategicCommunication\(s\).pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/IP2-08TheTroubleWithStrategicCommunication(s).pdf) (10.01.2013); *Paul C.* «Strategic Communication» Is Vague. Say What You Mean // Joint Force Quarterly. 2010. Issue 56. P. 10–13. URL: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/paul_sc_is_vague.pdf (10.01.2013).

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The Strategic Communication of Germany in Estonia during the Second World War

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Annotation

This article examines the «strategic communication» of German authorities during the occupation of Estonia. In the 1940s, the concept did not yet exist as such, but the same thing can be and has been expressed in different ways. Estonia was occupied by Germany from the summer of 1941 to autumn of 1944, during which time surveillance of individual's sentiments and propaganda work were coordinated by Germany's Security Police. Analysis shows that the organisation's situation assessments and the operating plans compiled on that basis correspond nearly 100 percent to the principles compiled by, for instance, the U.S. Department of Defense almost 70 years later. This indicates that strategic communication is based heavily on viewpoints that are not dependent on time, place or culture. In addition to theoretical contemplation, this study also analyses the main points of what taking these principles into consideration meant in practice in Estonia during World War II.

Keywords

Propaganda, strategic communication, German Security Police, Estonia, World War II.

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